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Rabineau: Rabineau: Speak Softly and Carry a Big Commerce Clause:

Those with Disabilities Take Heed: Eighth
Circuit Suggests that ADA May Not Protect
Those Who Fail to Control a Controllable
Disability
Burroughsv. City ofSpringfield'

I. INTRODUCTION
Finding that millions of Americans suffer discrimination as a result of a
disability, the federal government enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") in an attempt to rectify and prevent such injustice.2 For the most part,
many will find themselves within the ADA's protection. At times, however, an
individual may be unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination,
thereby finding himself excluded
In Burroughs v. City ofSpringfield, a case of first impression, the Eighth
Circuit considered whether the ADA's protection extends to one who fails to
control his diabetes.' The court determined that failure to control a controllable
disability, to the extent that it negatively impacts one's ability to ."meet the
employer's legitimate job expectations," does not warrant protection by the
ADA.'
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1990, Ray Burroughs ("Burroughs") was diagnosed with diabetes.' Five
years later, he sought a position as a police recruit with the City of Springfield,
Missouri ("the City").7 After Burroughs informed the City of his condition and
gave assurance that he was able to control it, he underwent a required physical

1. 163 F.3d 505 (8th Cir. 1998).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
3. In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show
that: (1) she has a disability, (2) she is an otherwise qualified individual, and (3) she was

discriminated against "because of" her disability. See infra note 30 and accompanying
text. Burroughs focuses on the third element of an ADA prima facie case--whether
alleged discrimination is "because of" a disability. Burroughs, 163 F.3d at 507. This

issue is distinct from the one the Supreme Court confronted during its recent decision in
Murphy v. UPS,Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999). In Murphy, the Court addressed the first

element of an ADA prima facie case-establishing the existence of a disability.
4. Burroughs, 163 F.3d at 505-09.
5. Id. at 509.
6. Id. at 506.
7. Burroughs v. City of Springfield, 163 F.3d 505 (8th Cir. 1998).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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examination.' The examining physician certified that Burroughs was able to
work without limitation.9 Subsequently, Burroughs was hired and commenced
employment as a recruit with the City police department."
Shortly after Burroughs began work, he suffered two hypoglycemic
episodes that caused him to become disoriented and dysfunctional to the point
of requiring immediate medical attention." In response, the City placed him on
"internal duty" and required him to undergo another medical exam. 2 On
January 11, 1996, Burroughs saw Dr. Larry E. Koppers ("Dr. Koppers").'3 After
examining Burroughs's records and condition, Dr. Koppers noted that
Burroughs's condition could be controlled by careful oversight of diet and
physical activity.' 4 The doctor also suggested, however, that it was
"inappropriate" for Burroughs to remain in his present position as he "could
conceivably be dangerous to the public" were he to have another episode. 5 The
City removed Burroughs from active duty and, on February 2, 1996, sent him a
letter requesting that he either agree to a demotion in accordance with a proposed
7
plan or resign.1 6 Burroughs resigned.
After resigning, Burroughs brought suit and alleged that the City violated
the ADA by discriminating against him because of his diabetic condition. 8 The
City moved for summary judgment.' 9 The United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri granted the motion on the grounds that Burroughs
failed to state a cause of action under the ADA.20 The court reasoned that
Burroughs "was not terminated 'because of his disability, but rather because he

8. Id.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.

14. Id. In addition, it appears that Burroughs was on an insulin regimen. Id. at
507-08.
15. Id. at 506.
16. Id. The letter sent to Burroughs read:
Because of the situations that happened on October 18, 1995, and December
4, 1995, the City has a responsibility to assess your physical condition for the
position of Police Officer. To assist the City in making a determination, with
your consent, we enlisted the aid of Dr. Larry E. Koppers, MD .... Dr.
Koppers' medical evaluation determined that it would be inappropriate to
have you maintain a position of carrying a weapon and that you could
conceivably be dangerous to the Public, until such time that you are able to
function without significant hypoglycemic episodes.
Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.

19. Id.
20. Id.
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failed to control his controllable disease." 2' Burroughs appealed, arguing that
summary judgment was improper in that there were material questions of fact as
to whether he was discriminated against "because of' his disability.2 2 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
decision and held that "where an employee knows that he is afflicted with a
disability, needs no accommodation from his employer, and fails to meet the
a controllable
employer's legitimatejob expectations, due to his failure to control
' 23
disability, he cannot state a cause of action under the ADA.
II.LEGAL BACKGROUND
While the federal government had previously enacted anti-discriminatory
legislation, the year 1973 ushered in an era of legislation targeted at eliminating
discrimination against the disabled in matters relating to employment.24 The first
of such legislation was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.25 This Act eventually
came under criticism, however, because its prohibitions extended only to those
entities receiving federal financial assistance. 2' This led some to suggest that
"[d]iscrimination against handicapped persons ...be prohibited in all the

contexts where Congress has seen fit to outlaw other forms of discrimination"
by extending coverage "to all entities that affect interstate commerce."27 In
1990, Congress responded to this call with the passage of the ADA.28

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 508-09 (quoting Sieficen v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664,
667 (7th Cir. 1995)).

24. Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Analysis and
Implication of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REV.

413, 428 (1991) (citing to various pieces of legislation aimed at discrimination).

25. The Rehabilitation Act provides, in part, that:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability... shall, by reason of her
or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under anyprogram or activity receiving

Federalfinancialassistance..."
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
26. See supra note 25.

27. Burgdorf, supra note 24, at 432 (citing Robert Burdgorf & Christopher Bell,
EliminatingDiscriminationAgainst Physically and Mentally HandicappedPersons: A
StatutoryBlueprint, 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 64, 71 (1984)).

28. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). In many respects, the
provisions of the ADA are significantly similar to those of the Rehabilitation Act. Courts
note that they may rely on cases and regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act in
construing the ADA. See, e.g., McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 374
n.1 (6th Cir. 1997); Allison v. Dep't of Corrections, 94 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 1996);
Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 n.2 (8th Cir. 1995); Vande Zande v.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 16

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 65

The ADA is divided into five titles, each of which addresses discrimination
within a particular context. Title I of the Act, aimed specifically at private sector
employment, provides that "no covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual."29 In implementing this general provision, courts have routinely
applied a three part test that must be satisfied in order to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. The plaintiff must show: (1) she has a disability, (2) she
is an otherwise qualified individual, and (3) she was discriminated against
"because of' her disability.30 While appearing relatively straightforward, each

of these elements has produced voluminous litigation and, at times, disagreement
among the federal circuits.3' Given this fact, each element is deserving of
individualized attention.

A. Assessing Existence of a DisabilityUnder the ADA
Under the ADA, the existence of a disability can be established in one of
several ways. The principal method is by showing that an individual has a
"physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities. 32 Not surprisingly, given the complexity of the ADA, these
fifteen words implicate a three pronged analysis. In Bragdon v. Abbott, the
Supreme Court noted that a plaintiff claiming a "disability" under this provision
must show that: (1) a physical or mental impairment exists, (2) a major life

Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995). Congress also
contemplated that the ADA was to be construed in a manner consistent with the
Rehabilitation Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (1994). As such, this Note will at times
include discussion of Rehabilitation Act cases where relevant to discussion of a similar
ADA provision.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). Among other things, a "covered entity" includes

any employer who has 15 or more employees working for him or her. See 42 U.S.C. §
12111(2), (5)(A) (1994).
30. See, e.g., Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 147 F.3d 784, 786 (8th Cir. 1998);
Wooten, 58 F.3d at 385. Under this test, courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting analysis under which a plaintiff must establish her prima faie case.
Upon such showing, the burden shifts to the employer, who must show a
nondiscriminatory reason for taking the adverse action. The burden will then shift back

to the plaintiff, who must show that the employer's reason is a pretext for purposeful
discrimination. See, e.g., Young v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018, 1021 (8th Cir.
1998); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 938 (3d Cir. 1997);
Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994); Wilking v. County of Ramsey,
983 F. Supp. 848, 852 (D. Minn. 1997).
31. See infra notes 38-63 and accompanying text (discussing circuit split in regards

to assessing existence of a disability).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A) (1994). "Disability" can also be established by
showing that the person is "regarded as having such an impairment" or has a "record of
having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(B)-(C) (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/16
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activity is affected, and (3) the impairment substantially limits the major life
activity. 33 The first two prongs, aside from occasional disagreement, are

analyzed relatively consistently; 34 the third, in contrast, resulted in a firestorm of
controversy and a split among the federal circuits that was only recently resolved
by the Supreme Court.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), in issuing
regulations to implement the ADA, has resolved that in assessing whether an
impairment is "substantially limiting" and therefore a disability, one must
determine whether the person alleging disability is unable to perform a major life
activity or is significantly restricted in its performance.35 In so doing, the courts
are to look at the nature, severity, duration, and long-term impact of the
impairment. 36 Additionally, EEOC interpretive guidelines contemplate that this
assessment is to be made "without regard to mitigating measures such as
medicine, or assistive or prosthetic devices. 37
Despite these guidelines, federal courts have differed as to whether
mitigating measures employed by a plaintiff should be considered. A majority
of circuits, including the Eighth, have held that such measures are not to be
considered. 3' For example, in Arnold v. UPS, Inc.,39 Arnold, a diabetic, was
33. 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998).
34. The "physical or mental impairment" and "major life activity" inquiries are not
the focus of this Note and will only be mentioned briefly. The term "physical or mental
impairment" is defined as a "physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss" affecting one of the "body systems," or "any mental
or physiological disorder." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1998). Under EEOC regulations,
assessment of such an impairment is "to be determined without regard to mitigating
measures." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 160, App. § 1630.2(h) (1998). The courts are generally in
agreement with this non-mitigating measure analysis. See, e.g., Baert v. Euclid
Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1998); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130
F.3d 893, 898-900 (10th Cir. 1997). "Major life activity" is defined as "functions such
as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working," although this list is not exhaustive. 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(i) (1998); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(i) (1998).
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (1998).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii) (1998). Assessment of disability is to be
conducted on a case-by-case basis. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1998). Some
impairments, such as deafness and blindness, are disabilities per se. See, e.g.,
Runnebaum v. Nationsbank, 123 F.3d 156, 166 n.5 (4th Cir. 1997). Diabetes, however,
is considered case-by-case even though the courts point out that a finding of "disability"
is the usual result. Baert, 149 F.3d at 631.
37. 29 C.F.RI pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1998) (emphasis added). See infra note
62-63 and accompanying text (indicating that the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the
position taken by the above EEOC interpretive guidelines).
38. See Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d. Cir.
1998), vacated by 119 S.Ct. 2388 (1999); Washington v. HCA Health Servs., 152 F.3d
464, 470 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated by 119 S.Ct. 2388 (1999); Arnold v. UPS, Inc., 136
F.3d 854, 863 (1st Cir. 1998); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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denied a job as a mechanic after his potential employer discovered that the
diabetes would keep Arnold from obtaining a certification that he allegedly
needed.40 Arnold brought suit under the ADA, but the district court granted
summary judgment for UPS after it assessed Arnold's condition as mitigated and
concluded that he was not disabled.4' On appeal, the First Circuit reversed and
held that Arnold's impairment was to be assessed in its unmitigated state. 42 In
so doing, his impairment would "substantially limit" a major life activity and
would constitute a disability.43
Turning first to the language of the ADA, the court stated that if the
language were clear on its face, the court would be bound to effectuate it.' It
noted, however, that the statute "just says 'impairment."' 45 This led the court to
turn to the legislative history of the ADA.46 Citing various provisions of the
Senate and House Reports suggesting that mitigating measures should not be
considered, the court found that it is "more consistent with Congress's broad7
remedial goals.., to interpret the words 'individual with a disability' broadly.4
Other cases adopting this view have also given attention to the statutory
language and the legislative history. The guiding factor, however, has been the
EEOC interpretive guidelines which, as previously noted, provide that mitigating
measures are not to be considered.48 While recognizing that these guidelines do
not carry the same weight as agency rules, courts have, nevertheless, found them
to be a permissible construction of the ADA and have deferred to the EEOC's
interpretation.49

933, 937 (3d Cir. 1997); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997),
cert.denied, 522 U.S. 1048 (1998); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521
(l1th Cir. 1996); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996); Roth
v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995). Professor Harris notes that
under this non-mitigation standard "the pertinent question is a 'what if' question." Erica
Worth Harris, ControlledImpairments Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A
Searchfor the Meaning of "Disability," 73 WASH. L. REv. 575, 581 (1998).

39. 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998).
40. Id. at 857.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 866.
43. Id.

44. Id. at 857-58.
45. Id. at 859 (citing Sicard v. City of Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1436 (N.D.
Iowa 1996)).
46. Id. at 859-60.
47. Id. at 861.
48. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Washington v. HCA Health Servs., 152 F.3d 464,469-70 (5th Cir.
1998), vacatedby 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999); Arnold v. UPS, Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 864 (1st

Cir. 1998); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3d Cir.
1997); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1997).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/16
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While this non-mitigatory analysis is the majority view, it has not always
been conclusively embraced. Even among those circuits adopting it, some have
done so with limitations 0 or with less than complete adherence from the district
courts.5" Furthermore, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,52 the Tenth Circuit
rejected this view altogether and made its assessment of disability by looking at
the impairment as mitigated.53
In Sutton, two individuals were denied positions as commercial airline
pilots because their uncorrected eyesight did not meet the required standard.54
They brought suit under the ADA, alleging that they were discriminated against
based on their disability. s Specifically, they alleged that their impairment in its
unmitigated state substantially limited a major life activity-seeing. 56 The court,
however, held that disability was to be assessed by "[taking] into consideration

mitigating or corrective measures utilized by the individual.",5' As such, the
court summarily rejected the EEOC interpretive guidelines and supporting case
law as being contrary to the express language of the ADA. 58 The court said:
"[W]e are concerned with whether the impairment affects the individual in fact,
not whether it would hypothetically affect the individual without the use of
corrective measures. 5 9
Even prior to Sutton, courts within the Tenth Circuit had assessed
impairments in their mitigated states.' Various scholars have also suggested that
this is the more reasoned approach. 6 Whether or not this is the case, however,

50. See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 866 (limiting holding to diabetes and suggesting that
minor impairments, such as myopia, may have to be considered in their mitigated state);
Washington, 152 F.3d at 470-71 (holding that only "serious" impairments requiring
repeated attention will be considered in their unmitigated states).
51. See, e.g., Wilking v. County of Ramsey, 983 F. Supp. 848, 854 (D. Minn.
1997) (holding that beneficial effects of depression medication will be considered);
Schluter v. Indus. Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (citing various
district court cases holding that impairment to be assessed as mitigated).
52. 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), aff'd, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
53. Id. at 902.
54. Id. at 895.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 900.
57. Id. at 902.
58.-Id.

59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 879-81 (D. Kan. 1996), af'd,
527 U.S. 516 (1999); Moore v. City of Overland Park, 950 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (D. Kan.
1996).
61. David A. Skidmore, Jr., MitigatingMeasures and the ADA: UPS Caught in
a Split Between the Circuits, FED. LAw., Nov./Dec. 1998, at 39 (arguing that
commonsense would recognize a difference between a blind man and one who simply
wears glasses); Harris, supra note 38, at 603 (arguing that" 'substantially limits' clearly
indicates that the determination is to be made with regard to the present reality").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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the Tenth Circuit's decision to break with the other circuits created a split, which
prompted the Supreme Court to consider the issue.62 In so doing, the Court
recently affirmed Sutton and held that disability is to be assessed with regard to
mitigating measures, 63notwithstanding contrary language in the EEOC
interpretive guidelines.

B. Assessing Whether One Is a "QualifiedIndividual"
Under the ADA, a "qualified individual" is defined as "an individual with

a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."6' Assuming that a plaintiff has been able to establish the existence of
a disability, she must next prove that she is otherwise qualified. Under EEOC
regulations, however, this is a two-step process. 65 As applied, the plaintiff will
first have to show that she has the "requisite skill, experience, education, and
other job-related requirements."' Once this criteria has been satisfied, the
plaintiff will then have to establish that she is able to perform the essential
functions of the job. While establishing that one has these requisite criteria is
easily accomplished, determining what "essential functions" and "reasonable
accommodations" entail can be more difficult. 67

62. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue. See Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), cert.granted,Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
119 S. Ct. 790 (1999).
63. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999). This
information is provided so as to clearly reflect the current state of the law. It must be
noted, however, that the Supreme Court ruled on this issue approximately six months
after the instant case was decided. As such, this Note will not discuss the Supreme
Court's opinion at greater length as it postdates the relevant legal background.
Furthermore, the opinion did not resolve the principal issue presented in the instant
decision-whether termination for failure to control a disability is termination "because
of' such disability.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).

65. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1998).
66. Id.; see also Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108, 1111-12 (8th Cir.
1995) (noting 2-step analysis).
67. In assessing "essential functions," the EEOC regulations provide that one is to
consider: (1) the employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job
descriptions; (3) amount of time spent performing the function; (4) consequences of not
requiring its performance; (5) terms of any collective bargaining agreement; (6) work
experience ofpast employees; and (7) the work experience of current employees. See 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (1998). For a definition of "reasonable accommodation," see 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1) (1998). Although by no means exclusive, this may include such
measures as job restructuring, modified work schedules, reassignment, acquisition of
work aids, and the like. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)
(1998). It is usually up to the plaintiff to propose an accommodation. See Mole v.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/16
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These issues often present themselves in the context of law enforcement
discrimination claims. In Scheer v. City of CedarRapids,6 for example, an Iowa
federal district court addressed them in a case involving an airport safety officer
("ASO") who was terminated shortly after informing his employer that he was
epileptic. 69 One of the functions of the ASO position included regularly driving
various vehicles.7" As such, driving was determined to be an "essential
function."'" This ASO, however, was unable to perform the function in that
applicable law prevented him from having a driver's license until such time as
he was seizure-free for six months.72 Ultimately, he requested a period of
leave. 3 The court, however, rejected this proposal and granted summary
judgment in favor of his employer.74 Noting that there was no guarantee that he
would be able to return to work in six months time, the court held that his leave
request was for an indefinite
period and that it was an accommodation which
75
was not "reasonhble.
In Holbrookv. City ofAlpharetta,76 the Eleventh Circuit also addressed

these issues after the plaintiff brought suit under the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act for alleged discrimination in being denied a promotion. Noting that his job
description required that he be able to both collect evidence and drive, the court
found these to be "essential functions., 77 The plaintiff, however, could not
perform these functions because of his condition. He instead argued that he
78
could be accommodated by "shuffling" his cases onto the other detectives.
Rejecting this argument, the court held that "reasonable accommodation" by way
ofjob restructure does not entail reallocating essential functions. 79 A Missouri
Buckhorn Rubber Products, Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1217 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct.
65 (1999); Wallin v. Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, 153 F.3d 681, 689 (8th Cir. 1998);
Scheer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 956 F. Supp. 1496 (N.D. Iowa 1997); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630,
app. § 1630.9 (1998). An employer is only required to provide a "reasonable"
accommodation, which may or may not be the one desired by the plaintiff. Gile v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 1996).
68. 956 F. Supp. 1496 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
69. Id. at 1497.

70. Id. at 1498.
71. Id. at 1501
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 1499.
Id. at 1503.
Id. at 1501-02; see also Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 142 F.3d 999, 1004

(7th Cir. 1998) (citing various cases in which indefinite leave held to be an unreasonable
accommodation).
76. 112 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1997).

77. Id. at 1527.
78. Id. at 1528.
79. Id. See, e.g., Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Products, Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1218

(8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 65 (1999); Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 147
F.3d 784, 788 (8th Cir. 1998); Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1080
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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federal district court reached a similar result in Simon v. St. Louis County, 80 a
Rehabilitation Act case. The court held that a paraplegic individual was not
"otherwise qualified" to serve as a commissioned police officer because he could
not perform the "essential functions" of the job-effecting a forceful arrest and
transferring between the various departments as needed-and could not
reasonably expect the department to modify them.8'
While not addressing the "qualified individual" issue directly, the Seventh
Circuit also touched on it in Sietken v. Village ofArlington Heights.82 This case
involved a police officer who failed to control his diabetes and suffered a
hypoglycemic episode that apparently rendered him unable to perform his duties
and caused him to drive in an oblivious state for forty miles.83 The court noted
that he failed to meet his employer's legitimate job expectations, thereby
suggesting that he was not performing the "essential functions."'
When
questioned, however, the plaintiff suggested that he would be able to perform
them were he given a "second chance."8'5 The court held that this was not86a
"reasonable accommodation" that the department was obligated to provide.
One accommodation that has been deemed reasonable in the law
enforcement context, however, is reassignment of the plaintiff. On occasion, the
plaintiff may propose this reassignment. 87 Sometimes though, the plaintiff is put
in a position where he or she may not have a choice. In Karbusicky v. City of
Park Ridge, 8 for example, a hearing impaired officer was transferred to a
community service position after not being able to perform the "essential

(6th Cir. 1988) (interpreting the Rehabilitation Act). It should be noted, however, that
job restructuring is reasonable where it entails reallocation of only "marginal" functions.
See, e.g., Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995);
Rhoades v. Atchison-Holt Elec. Co-op., No. 96-6057-CV-W-6, 1997 WL 839482, at *5
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 20, 1997).
80. 563 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1984).
81. Id. at 81. This case raised an interesting corollary issue concerning whether
functions can really be deemed "essential" to all police officers when it is unlikely that
all will be called upon to perform them. This issue was apparently resolved in the
affirmative. See Simon v. St. Louis County, 735 F.2d 1082, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 1984).
For a related inquiry, see also Allison v. Dep't of Corrections, 94 F.3d 494, 497-98 (8th
Cir. 1996) (noting existence of question of fact as to whether restraining inmates is an
"essential function" for those guards not routinely called upon to do such).
82. 65 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 1995).
83. Id. at 665. In addition, the officer remembered nothing of the event. Id.
84. Id. at 667.
85. Id. at 666.
86. Id. at 666-67; see also Rogers v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1341
(M.D. Ala. 1998) (noting that a "second chance" is not a reasonable accommodation).
87. See, e.g., Vazquez v. Bedsole, 888 F. Supp. 727,731 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (plaintiff
requested transfer to position where she would not have to carry weapon, apprehend
fugitives, or drive an automobile).
88. 950 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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functions" of his position.8 9 While the city had previously tried to accommodate
him through provision of hearing aids, they were ineffective. As such, transfer
to a position not requiring that he carry a weapon and make arrests was the only
remaining alternative. 90 While sometimes the only option, reassignment is
nevertheless disfavored and should only be turned to after other attempts to
accommodate have failed.9'
It must also be briefly noted that an individual who appears "qualified" may
not always be protected if he or she poses a "direct threat." 92 As defined by the
ADA, this includes one who poses "a significant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." 93 In School
Board v. Arline,94 a Rehabilitation Act case, the Supreme Court said that this risk
is to be assessed by taking into account the duration of risk, nature and severity
of harm, likelihood that harm will occur, and imminence of potential harm.95
Furthermore, the assessment must be based on medical or objective evidence
rather than just the employer's belief.96
At times, courts have upheld blanket prohibitions against allowing certain
individuals to hold a given job. 97 These cases, however, appear to be the
exception rather than the rule. EEOC guidelines require that this determination
be based on an "individualized assessment, '98 and the courts have, for the most
part, followed this guidance. In Bombrys v. City of Toledo,99 for example, the
court struck down a prohibition against allowing diabetics to become police
officers.1' In part, this decision was based on the EEOC guidelines requiring an
individualized assessment. 1' More importantly, however, the court held that
"presumptions [which] irrebuttably determine that an individual is unqualified

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 882.
Id. at 884-85.
Id. at 884 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o) (1998)).
In such situations, the ADA provides an employer with a defense if the alleged

discriminatory action was taken due to the existence of such a threat. See 42 U.S.C. §
12113(a)-(b) (1994).

For a definition of "direct threat," see infra note 93 and

accompanying text.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1994).
94. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
95. Id. at 288; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)(l)-(4) (1998).
96. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998).
97. See, e.g., Davis v. Meese, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989); Chandler v. City of
Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1011 (1994).
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1998).
99. 849 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. Ohio 1993).

100. Id. at 1221.
101. Id. at 1216; see also Stillwell v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 872 F.
Supp. 682, 687 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (striking down blanket exclusion as violating the
individualized assessment requirement).
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for a particular job are violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 2
C. Determining Whether DiscriminationIs "Because of' the
Disability
One can imagine various situations in which an employee could be
terminated for a reason that is not "because of' a disability. For example, there
may be legitimate economic reasons, such as a downturn in the economy,
wherein both disabled and non-disabled employees alike are terminated. 0 3
Likewise, if an employer knows nothing of the employee's disability, courts
have held that termination can certainly not be "because of' it."° The more
difficult issues arise, however, in situations where there is a closer causal
connection between the reason for termination and the disability. In such cases,
the federal circuits have utilized conflicting methods of analysis.0 5
One approach has been to hold that termination for conduct that has a
sufficiently strong causal connection to the underlying disability will be analyzed
1c6 In Teahan v. Metrothe same as would termination for the disability itself.
North Commuter Railroad Co., °7 a prominent Rehabilitation Act case, the
Second Circuit adopted such an approach. In Teahan, an individual suffering
from alcoholism and drug abuse brought suit after being fired for excessive
absenteeism. 'O Appealing a summary judgment below, the plaintiff argued that
the trial court "improperly shifted the burden to him to present evidence ' of°9
pretext" as his "absenteeism was 'caused by' his substance abuse problem.'
Agreeing with the plaintiff, the court noted that the "relevant inquiry is into the
causal connection" and held that "termination by an employer subject to the Act
which is justified as being due to absenteeism shown to be caused by substance
abuse is termination 'solely by reason of' that substance abuse.""'

102. Bombrys, 849 F. Supp. at 1217; see also Stillwell, 872 F. Supp. at 688 (noting
that blanket exclusions also violate notions of due process).
103. See, e.g., Borkowski v. Valley Central Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 143 (2d Cir.
1995); Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1340 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,501 U.S. 1217
(1991) (budget constraints).
104. See Morisky v. Broward Co., 80 F.3d 445, 447-48 (11th Cir. 1996); Miller v.
National Gas Co., 61 F.3d 627, 629-30 (8th Cir. 1995); Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co.,
47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995); Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., 994 F.2d 1178, 1181
(6th Cir. 1993).
105. John P. Gause, The ADA in Practice: Navigatingthe Minefield, 13 ME. B.J.
30,33-34 (1998) (summarizing the conflicting approaches).
106. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
107. 951 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1991).
108. Id. at 513.

109. Id. at514.
110. Id. at 517. This "solely by reason of' phrase is the counterpart of "because
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In contrast, a majority of courts, including the Eighth Circuit,"' have
effectively rejected Teahan's causal analysis. In its place, they attempt to draw

a distinct line between the plaintiff's conduct and disability. In so doing, the
question becomes whether the adverse employment action was taken "because
of' the disability, thereby violating the ADA, or whether it was taken "because
of' the conduct, thereby allowing courts to disregard any causal connection
between the two." 2
The conduct/disability distinction appears to have predominantly arisen in
the context of alcohol-related cases. In Maddox v. University of Tennessee,1,3
for example, Maddox, a football coach, was terminated after having been
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol." 4 Maddox asserted that he
was terminated "because of' his disability in that impaired driving is a "causally
connected manifestation of the disability of alcoholism."' 5 The court dismissed
this argument, however, and pointed out that "a number of cases have considered
the issue of misconduct as distinct from the status of the disability.""..6 Joining
those jurisdictions that have so held, and rejecting the approach taken by Teahan,
the court concluded that employees, disabled or not, must be treated alike when
it comes to "egregious or criminal conduct.""' 7 Cases both prior and subsequent
8
to Maddox have repeatedly drawn this distinction in alcohol-related cases."

of' under the ADA. It is important to note that even under the analysis adopted in
Teahan, the courts will not take the causal connection as established merely because it
is alleged to exist. It is a question of fact, and the court pointed out that had a significant
portion of the absences been due to something other than alcoholism, the termination
might not have been "solely by reason of" the disability. Id.
111. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
112. See Fritz v. Mascotech Automotive Sys. Group, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1481, 1493
(E.D. Mich. 1996). If the employer can point to any conduct of the plaintiffas justifying
his employment decision, the plaintiff will likely not prevail. The employer will,
however, have to show that the employment decision is attributable to the plaintiffs
conduct instead of an "improper consideration of Plaintiff's disability." Id. If, in fact,
the disability itselfis considered and makes a difference in the employment decision, the
employer will not be able to avoid liability. See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99
F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (11th Cir. 1996).
113. 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995).
114. Id. at 845.
115. Id. at 846.
116. Id. at 847.
117. Id. at 848.
118. See, e.g., Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 906 (9th Cir. 1995) (termination
was for "egregious and criminal conduct" in firing weapon in bar, not alcoholism);
Williams v. Widnall, 79 F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (10th Cir. 1996) (fired for misconduct in
making threats against co-workers despite fact that actions were the direct result of
alcoholism); DeSpears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting
that the disability was not the sole cause of firing in that the plaintiff acted in deciding
to drive while drunk); Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 754 (1st Cir. 1995) (Rehabilitation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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In the meantime, the conduct/disability distinction has been increasingly
applied in different contexts as well. In Houck v. City ofPrairieVillage,"9 for
example, a Kansas federal court drew the distinction where a police officer
suffering from a "variety of mental conditions" 2 ' was ultimately terminated after
engaging in conduct that included domestic battery, battery on a fellow officer,
and violations of the police code of conduct. ' Although the officer argued that
the firing was discriminatory in that "his alleged misconduct was caused by his
disability," the court rejected this claim." In so doing, the court stated that "[a]
person who commits a criminal act as a result of a disabling condition is not
excused from the employment consequences of the criminal act because of the
disability."'' Similarly, in EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 24 the First Circuit rejected the
proposition that the ADA should protect disability-related conduct to the same
extent as the underlying disability and held that an individual suffering from
clinical depression was terminated "because 25
of" her conduct in attempting
suicide rather than "because of' the disability.
Leading up to the instant case, the approach taken by courts within the
Eighth Circuit had not been entirely clear. On at least one occasion, for
example, it appeared that the court was leaning towards adoption of causal
analysis similar to that of Teahan126 In Perkins v. St. Louis County Water Co.,127
the plaintiff brought suit under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act after being

Act case noting that termination was for excessive absences caused by incarceration for
drunk driving rather than disability); Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255, 259 (4th Cir. 1993)
(Rehabilitation Act case noting that alcoholic was not terminated "solely by reason of his
handicap").
.
119. 978 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Kan. 1997).
120. Id. at 1399. These conditions included "post-traumatic stress syndrome,
borderline personality disorder, psychosis from mania, unipolar depression, bipolar
depression, clinical depression, chronic depression and chemical imbalance of the brain."

Id.
121. Id. at 1401. These were the charges listed in the officer's pre-termination
notice. Id.
122. Id. at 1403.
123. Id. Although not phrasing its holding in precisely the same manner, the

Seventh Circuit's decision in Sieficen v. Village ofArlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664 (7th
Cir. 1995), also implicitly applied the distinction to a case involving diabetes-related
conduct. As previously discussed, this case involved a diabetic police officer who was
terminated after failing to control a controllable disease, which thereby resulted in erratic
driving. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
124. 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997).
125. Id. at 149. Significantly, however, the court left the door open to situations
where the disability is such that it "compels" the undesirable conduct. Id.; see also
DeSpears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the compulsion
argument).
126. See infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
127. 160 F.3d 446 (8th Cir. 1998).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/16
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terminated for a pattern of unexcused absences. 28 Specifically, the plaintiff
alleged that he had been discriminated against "because of' his Meniere's
disease and permanent hearing loss. 1 29 Rather than simply holding that the
plaintiffwas terminated "because of' his absences, however, the court undertook
further analysis. 30 Ultimately addressing the hearing loss, the court upheld
summary judgment for the employer and stated that the plaintiff "ha[d] not
produced sufficient evidence that his hearing impairment was linked to his
absences from work and to his subsequent termination for excessive
absenteeism." 13' The implication of this was to suggest that the plaintiff
may
132
have prevailed had he been able to establish a stronger causal link.
Ultimately, the Perkins decision stands in relative isolation, as several
courts within the circuit have indicated that conduct is to be analyzed separately
from the underlying disability. 33 For example, in Grimes v. UnitedStates Postal
Service, ' a Rehabilitation Act case, a Missouri federal court held that an
individual who possessed and distributed drugs at work was not terminated
"solely because of' his marijuana addiction. 35 Despite the plaintiff s argument
that the disability caused him to engage in such activity, the court noted that the
36
termination was because of his conduct rather than the disability itself.
Similarly, in Larson v. Koch Refining Co., 37 a Minnesota federal court drew a
conduct/disability distinction where an employee was fired for his short notice
absences and criminal conduct in driving drunk and committing an assault rather
than for his alcoholism. 3 Addressing claims under the ADA and the State's

128. Id. at 447.
129. Id. at 448-49. Meniere's disease was defined by the court as "a condition that

causes occasional episodes of vertigo and vomiting." Id. at 448.
130. Id. at 448-49.
131. Id. at449.
132. Apparently not satisfied with the court's analysis and the implications thereof,

a concurring judge felt that the plaintiffs abuse of the absenteeism policy had
"established a separate cause for discharge," and that this was the ground upon which the
judgment should have been affirmed. Id. at 450.
133. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.

134. 872 F. Supp. 668 (W.D. Mo. 1994), aff'd, 74 F.3d 1243 (8th Cir. 1996).
135. Id. at 675-76.
136. Id. at 676. ("The Act does not prohibit an employer from discharging an
employee who commits a crime or otherwise engages in improper conduct when the
improper conduct, rather than the alleged addiction, is the reason for discharge."). Id.

137. 920 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1996).
138. Id. at 1005; see also Harris v. Polk County, 103 F.3d 696, 697 (8th Cir. 1996)
(permissible to base decision not to hire on criminal shoplifting record despite fact that
shoplifting was a causally-related symptom of mental illness); Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber
Products, Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1219 n.3 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that "[fliring an employee
because ofthe job performance consequences of a disability... rather than the disability

itself, is not actionable under the ADA.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 65
(1999).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Human Rights Act, the court noted that misconduct is not protected and need not
be tolerated.' 39
IV. INSTANT DECISION
After reciting the facts of the case as presented at the district court, Circuit
Judge Hansen, writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, noted that the ADA prohibits a "covered entity" from discriminating
"against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
an individual."' The court went on to observe that in order to state a claim, the
plaintiff must show that he has a disability, is qualified, and was discriminated
against "because of" his disability. 41 Noting that the parties did not dispute that
the City of Springfield was a "covered entity" or that Burroughs was both
"disabled" and a "qualified individual," the court declined to discuss these issues
further. 42 Instead, it turned its attention to the43question of whether the adverse
action was taken "because of' the disability.
The court pointed out that while it had not yet considered this issue, it was
44
guided and persuaded by a factually similar case from the Seventh Circuit.'
The court then turned to a brief discussion of Siejken v. Village of Arlington
Heights, where a police officer failed to control his diabetic condition and was
terminated "not 'because of' his disability, but because he failed to control a
controllable disease."'14 Noting that Burroughs did not dispute that his disability
was also controllable, the court observed that the prior episodes were
46
Burroughs's own fault because of "poor timing of his meals and activities."'
The court next turned to Burroughs's argument that reliance on Siejken was
misplaced in that there existed a material question of fact regarding whether
Burroughs was responsible for the hypoglycemic episodes.4' Although
Burroughs cited reports by his physician indicating that he was compliant and
able to perform his duties, the court found the reports to be "out of context"
because they were written "before [the doctor] had reviewed the medical records
of Burroughs's latest on-duty episodes.', 48 Furthermore, the court pointed out
that Burroughs had to be at fault because he "admit[ted] that the episodes
139. Id. at 1004-05.
140. Burroughs v. City of Springfield, 163 F.3d 505, 507 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994)).
141. Id. at 507.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 665-66 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
145. Id.

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 508.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/16
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resulted from changes in his eating schedule," which was a "matter within his
control."' 49 Therefore, the court found no merit in the claim that there was a
material question of fact precluding summary judgment. 50
The court then turned to Burroughs's second argument that he was
wrongfully terminated in that the City had not shown that he was a "direct
threat.'' After observing that one may not be a "qualified individual" if he
poses a "direct threat," the court found this inquiry to be "not exactly on point"
because the parties had already conceded this issue.'52 Nevertheless, the court
discussed the risk posed by Burroughs. Referring again to the two prior
hypoglycemic episodes and the doctor's testimony regarding the dangers posed,
the court found that "[t]he inherent and substantial risk of serious harm arising
from such episodes, given the nature of police work, is self-evident."'5 3
Finally, the court addressed Burroughs's third argument that he was entitled
to an accommodation, but found it unnecessary to consider this issue because
Burroughs was unable to establish a claim under the ADA.'54 The court,
therefore, affirmed the summary judgment and stated that "when an employee
knows that he is afflicted with a disability, needs no accommodation from his
employer, and fails to meet the employer's legitimate job expectations, due to
a controllable disability, he cannot state a cause of action
his failure to control
55
ADA."'
the
under
V. COMMENT
The instant case is important in that it has the potential to significantly
impact a future plaintiff's ability to recover on an ADA claim. The Eighth
Circuit has clearly stated that when a person fails to control a controllable
disability that such person is capable of controlling without any accommodation,
and thereby fails to meet his employer's expectations, that person will not be
able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 56 Thus, future plaintiffs
may not be able to recover if they have been lax in their own care. Of equal
significance to this holding, however, is the process by which it was reached.
is not only significant for what it says, but also
In this respect, the instant opinion
57
address.
to
failed
it
for what
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 508-09.
155. Id. at 509 (citing Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 667
(7th Cir. 1995)).
156. Id.
157. Because the court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's holding in
Sutton prior to deciding this case, it should probably first have clarified why it believed
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Because the parties conceded the "disability" and "qualified individual"
issues,5' the court was faced with a situation where it could either challenge the

parties' concessions or base its decision on the third element by finding that
Burroughs was not discriminated against "because of' his disability. This latter
approach is the one that the court chose. 9 In so doing, the court, although never
explicitly saying so, rejected Teahan's causal analysis and extended application
of the conduct/disability distinction to failure to control diabetes. In fact, had the
court not done so, Burroughs clearly would have been terminated "because of'
his disability in that he would not have had a hypoglycemic episode or failed to
meet his employer's expectations but for his diabetes.
In implementing the distinction between conduct and disability, the court
followed somewhat circular reasoning. As previously discussed, it began by
noting that Burroughs was a "qualified individual."' 6 A great deal of the
remainder of the opinion, however, was spent discussing how Burroughs's
failure to control his disability rendered him unable to meet his employer's
legitimate expectations in a safe manner.' 6' In light of this discussion, the court
seemed to suggest that Burroughs was not a "qualified individual." Yet, this is
a contention that the court rejected twice in its opinion. 62
The instant opinion, therefore, raises the question of why the court would
discuss factors traditionally associated with a "qualified individual" analysis,
while purporting to resolve this case on other grounds. The court apparently did

the parties' "disability" concession to be correct. The Eighth Circuit had expressed its
opinion that the existence of a "disability" was to determined without regard to
mitigating factors. See supranote 38 and accompanying text. At least one district court

within the circuit, however, had reached a contrary result. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text. Interestingly, those courts taking the minority position (and that
which we now know to be the correct one) had looked to the impairment as mitigated by
the plaintiff, not as it may "potentially" have been mitigated. See, e.g., Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997) ("The determination of whether an
individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity should take into
consideration mitigating or corrective measures utilized by the individual."). Thus
Burroughs, although voluntarily disabled, would admittedly have been disabled
nonetheless. This factor has the corollary effect of dramatically increasing the
importance of the instant case. Assuming that there really is no present duty to mitigate
(at least in the context of establishing the existence of a disability) and that a person can
essentially choose to elevate his or her impairment to the level of a disability, future
courts will be increasingly inclined to turn towards the "because of' element that
Burroughsfocuses on in rejecting an ADA claim. As discussed later in this Note, courts
may wish to consider rejecting this inevitable trend and instead resolve cases similar to
Burroughson "qualified individual" grounds.
158. See Burroughs v. City of Springfield, 163 F.3d 505, 507 (8th Cir. 1998).

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 507-09.
162. Id. at 507, 508.
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so because it did not want an employer to be permitted to discriminate based on
nothing more than an employee's conduct in failing to control a controllable
disability, where that conduct does not somehow pose a risk or affect the
employee's ability to meet his employer's expectations. Thus, by discussing job
performance and the risk factor, the court ensured that termination "because of'
failure to control will only withstand scrutiny where such failure results in
secondary conduct' 6 that would appearto render the person unqualified."
Ultimately, however, one must ask whether a "because of' analysis based
upon the conduct/disability distinction is the best approach in the context of the
instant case. As earlier noted, the distinction has been made, for the most part,
in cases involving "egregious or criminal" misconduct. 61 There is good reason,
however, to argue that diabetes should be treated differently. For example, an
individual makes a conscious choice to drink and get behind the wheel of a
vehicle, commit an assault, or distribute drugs-these are all affirmative acts.
It is more difficult, however, to classify failure to control diabetes as "egregious
or criminal" in nature. Furthermore, even if one classifies the wrongful conduct
as patrolling while suffering a hypoglycemic episode, such conduct still does not
appear to be "egregious or criminal." The diabetic, after all, engages in such
activity without conclusively knowing whether she will suffer such an
impairment."6 Perhaps recognizing this difficult issue, the Seventh Circuit in
Sieflcen arguably appeared hesitant to rest its holding on "failure to control"
alone. Although ultimately stating that it was expressing "no opinion on these
issues," the court cited decisions which held that diabetics were not "qualified
individual[s]" as a matter of law for positions in which they would be required
to operate a motor vehicle. 67 While the court admittedly did not decide the case

163. An illustration adapted from the court's opinion in Teahan v. Metro-North
Commuter RailroadCo., 951 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1991), will help illustrate this point.
If an individual has a disability that causes him to make a "thump" when walking, and
he could control the same, but chooses not to do so, termination will not be justified
unless the thump somehow renders him unable to perform adequately. In other words,
a person canot be terminated merely "because of' failure to control harmless
manifestations of a disability.
164. In the instant case, such secondary conduct was apparently the disorientation
and dysfunction while on patrol.
165. See supranotes 113-39 and accompanying text.
166. The same difficulties present themselves even if one tries to analogize the
instant case to those where conduct less than "egregious or criminal" in nature, i.e.
excessive absences, served as a basis for permissible termination. Even here, the
employee's conduct is somewhat reprehensible to the extent that he is acting in knowing
violation of company policy. This is different than the diabetic, who perhaps through
sheer inadvertence or accident, may fail to take the steps necessary to control the
disability effectively or appreciate the consequences of a failure to control until those
consequences are actually realized.
167. Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 665 (7th Cir. 1995).
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on these grounds, it.
at least recognized the existence of an alternative basis for
resolving the issue.
As a practical matter, the Eighth Circuit likely had little leeway as to the
grounds upon which it resolved the instant case given the parties' concessions.
On policy grounds, however, this case could have been more soundly decided
had the court been given full opportunity to undertake a true "qualified
individual" analysis. In Burroughs, it was not entirely clear what the essential
functions of the job were. By looking to EEOC regulations and analogizing to
other cases, however, one may safely assume that they included such things as
driving an automobile, effecting an arrest, firing a weapon, and the like.'68
Burroughs was certainly not able to perform these functions in that he was
disoriented to the point of requiring emergency medical treatment.'69
Furthermore, objective evidence established that he posed a very real risk to
health and safety. 7 These facts would appear to support a contention that he
was not qualified. Yet, the inquiry does not end here. Instead, the court would
have had to ask whether Burroughs could have performed these duties with

"reasonable accommodation.''

Apparently, the parties thought that a "reasonable accommodation" was
possible because they did not contest that Burroughs was qualified.72 However,
it has been proposed that "reasonable accommodation" be interpreted such that
an accommodation may not be "reasonable" if an individual with a mutable
disability "refuses or fails to take reasonable steps to improve or eliminate the
condition."' 73 This approach is based upon the proposition that reasonableness
cannot be assessed in isolation, but rather must be viewed with regard to all of
the existing circumstances, including the actions of the disabled employee. 74
Thus, if an employee fails to first help himself in a situation where reasonable
self-help would be availing, the conclusion should be that it would not be
"reasonable" to burden the employer with the responsibility to provide
accommodation. 17 Such an analysis would have been well suited to the instant
case. Burroughs's disability was indeed mutable, at least to the extent that its
effects and manifestations could be reduced, if not eliminated.' 76 Furthermore,
168. See supranotes 68-91 and accompanying text.
169. Burroughs v. City of Springfield, 163 F.3d 505, 505 (8th Cir. 1998).
170. Id. at 508 (noting two instances of hypoglycemic episodes while on duty).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1997) (qualified individual may also include one
who with reasonable accommodation can perform the essential functions).
172. See Burroughs, 163 F.3d at 507.
173. Lisa E.Key, Voluntary Disabilities and the ADA: A Reasonable
Interpretationof "ReasonableAccommodation, "48 HASTINGS L.J. 75, 96-103
(1996).
174. Id. at 76.
175. Id. at 103.
176. The physician who examined Burroughs noted that it would be possible for
Burroughs "to control the episodes by the careful timing of meals and activities."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/16
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the steps that would have been required of Burroughs were not unreasonable or
unbearably imposing in that all that would have been required was oversight of
diet and an insulin regimen.177 Since it is clear that Burroughs was not taking
these steps, at least on two occasions, 178 he would not have been entitled to an
accommodation, thus remaining unqualified and justifying termination on this
ground.
Although the above analysis was not argued before the Eighth Circuit in

Burroughs,future litigants and courts may want to consider relying on it. As has
been noted, it would not only produce sound results, but would also keep those
79
who are disabled from exploiting the protections offered by the ADA.'
Furthermore, it would only marginally increase the scope of factual inquiry
As has been discussed, courts already consider the
required of a court.'
employee's conduct in assessing whether an alleged discriminatory employment
action was taken "because of' the disability.18 1 Of course, this factor raises an
interesting issue about whether this approach is distinguishable from the
"because of' analysis. After all, some may ask, does it too not also base the
ultimate determination of whether liability will attach on the employee's
conduct? The answer is that it does. Public policy, however, would arguably be
best served by taking the "qualified individual" approach. This approach would
allow a court to require an individual to control her controllable disability while
still making her bear responsibility for failure to do so. The benefit, however,
is that it does so without placing failure to control diabetes into a category of
conduct that has heretofore been reserved for that which is "egregious or
criminal" in nature, or at the very least, reprehensible.' 82

Burroughs v. City of Springfield, 163 F.3d 505, 506 (8th Cir. 1998). The definition of
mutability being applied here is consistent with the manner in which Professor Key
defined mutability. See Key, supra note 173, at 75.
177. The record on this matter is slightly unclear as it was suggested that oversight
of meals and activities was all that was required by Burroughs. See supra note 14 and
accompanying text. It would seem, however, that Burroughs may also have been on an
insulin regimen. See Burroughs, 163 F.3d at 507-08. The steps that Burroughs was
required to take in order to mitigate his disability are an important component of the
analysis. Professor Key proposes that whether a plaintiff should be required to mitigate
before being entitled to a "reasonable" accommodation must depend on whether the
mitigatory action required would be reasonable in and of itself as determined by the law
of "avoidable consequences." See Key, supra note 173, at 98-103.
178. Burroughs, 163 F.3d at 506-07.
179. See Key, supra note 173, at 103-04.
180. The slightly increased burden would result from the court having to consider
the law of "avoidable consequences" and assess whether it would have been reasonable

to require the mitigatory action. See supra note 177.
181. See supra notes 113-39 and accompanying text.
182. Some may argue that Burroughs's conduct was reprehensible given the nature
of his position and the public trust which he held. Had he gone to work while in the
middle of a hypoglycemic episode, there might be merit to this. The episodes, however,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Burroughs v. City of Springfield is
significant in that failure to control a controllable disability may now be equated
with misconduct sufficient to nullify a cause of action under the ADA. In cases
such as this, many would probably agree that the outcome was correct. At the
same time, however, future litigants and courts may want to reconsider the
decision's basis. Public policy would seem to allow that someone who fails to
control a disability is not a "qualified individual." It does not, however, warrant
a finding that failure to control diabetes rises to the level of unacceptable
misconduct as that classification has traditionally been defined.
BRIAN T. RABINEAU

appear to have occurred after he was already on duty. Burroughs v. City of Springfield,
163 F.3d 505, 506 (8th Cir. 1998). There is a difference between someone like
Burroughs, who might not suffer a hypoglycemic episode (or might suffer one
inadvertently), and someone who knowingly, intentionally, and often recklessly engages
in misconduct.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/16
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